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RISK AND RESILIENCE IN HEALTH DATA INFRASTRUCTURE
W. Nicholson Price II, PhD *
Today’s health system runs on data. However, for a system that generates and requires
so much data, the health care system is surprisingly bad at maintaining, connecting, and
using those data. In the easy cases of coordinated care and stationary patients, the system
works—sometimes. But when care is fragmented, fragmented data often result.
Fragmented data create risks both to individual patients and to the system. For
patients, fragmentation creates risks in care based on incomplete or incorrect information, and
may also lead to privacy risks from a patched-together system. For the system, data
fragmentation hinders efforts to improve efficiency and quality, and to drive health innovation
based on collected data.
Efforts to combat data fragmentation would benefit by considering the idea of health
data infrastructure. Most obviously, that would be infrastructure for health data—that is,
infrastructure on which health data can be stored and transmitted. But it should also be an
infrastructure of health data—that is, a platform of shared data on which to base further
efforts to increase the efficiency or quality of care.
Today’s health system runs on data. Patients and doctors complain about
the proportion of time during a patient appointment that is spent entering data
into the doctor’s computer, but this has become the new normal. Data are
supposed to help improve care for individual patients, to increase the
efficiency of the system as a whole, and to provide the basis for future
innovation in care.
However, for a system that generates and requires so much data, the health
care system is surprisingly bad at maintaining, connecting, and using those
data. In the easy cases, it works. If a patient stays with the same primary care
physician, coordinates all care through that physician, goes to the same
pharmacy, the same hospital, and the same labs, and uses the same insurer,
that patient’s records may—may—be integrated into a single comprehensive
medical record that tracks the patient’s health over time. But patients don’t
behave like this most of the time. Patients move between providers, pick up
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. JD, 2011, Columbia
University School of Law. PhD (Biological Sciences), 2010, Columbia University Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences. For helpful conversations and feedback, I wish to thank Ana
Bracic, Rebecca Eisenberg, Brett Frischmann, and the participants in the Silicon Flatirons
Digital Broadband Migration Conference. All errors are my own.
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drugs while traveling, switch insurers as they change jobs (or lose them), see
different specialists, and generally vary the parameters of their care. And the
health data system does a poor job accounting for this fragmentation of care,
resulting in fragmented data.
Fragmented data create risks to patients and to the system as a whole. At
the patient level, fragmentation creates risks in care, where information
necessary for effective care is either not available or incorrect. Fragmentation
also creates risks for patient privacy, as a result of the needs to haphazardly
share data across different health actors. At the systemic level, data
fragmentation hinders efforts to make the system more efficient as a whole,
because putative optimizers only see a fragment of the picture. It also slows
innovation in health, especially big-data driven modern initiatives that rely on
large, high-quality datasets for their power and accuracy.
Efforts to combat data fragmentation would benefit by considering the
idea of health data infrastructure. Most obviously, that would be infrastructure
for health data—that is, infrastructure on which health data can be stored and
transmitted. But it should also be an infrastructure of health data—that is, a
platform of shared data on which to base further efforts to increase the
efficiency or quality of care.
This essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the landscape of health
data today, including potential benefits of the collection of health data and the
reasons for fragmentation which limits those benefits. Part II describes the
risks of a fragmented health data system. Part III sketches the basics of how
an infrastructure vision for and of health data might look.
I. HEALTH DATA TODAY
The health system generates a blizzard of data at an increasing rate. From
the paper records of prior practice, providers have largely moved to use
electronic health records (also called electronic medical records).1 New forms
of data are proliferating to fill those records, including the reports of
traditional medical encounters, high-volume diagnostic tests such as genetic
sequencing and analysis, prescription records, and others.2
1 The move to electronic health records was not accidental. A substantial sum was made
available for providers to shift to electronic records HITECH Act, passed as part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (Feb. 17,
2009) (ARRA), Div. A, Title XIII, Div. B, Title IV. See SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC
HEALTH RECORDS & MEDICAL BIG DATA 38–40 (2016). As a powerful counterpart, penalties
are imposed on entities failing to shift to and meaningfully use electronic records by
established deadlines. See id. at 41–42; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare
and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics, Jan. 12, 2016, https://www.cms.gov/regulations-andguidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/basics.html.
2 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Health Innovation on the
Demand Side, __ J.L. & BIOSCIENCES __ (2017).
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A. Potential Benefits
These data are collected for a reason; they are supposed to create
substantial benefits for patients, providers, and for the health system as a
whole. Ideally, they should lead to improved care for individual patients as
integrated medical records prevent easily avoidable medical error and allow a
broader picture of the patient’s overall health.3 They should enable more
efficient care by reducing the costs of coordination, should decrease costs, and
should even enable more effective and efficient billing by insurers. On a
slightly more systemic level, many health care reforms rely on the ability to
measure care precisely—for instance, to observe whether patients are treated
according to approved procedures or are readmitted to hospitals too
frequently.4 Health data enable the imposition of sanctions or the provision of
incentives to try to shape health care in productive ways.5
Data are also supposed to enable us to draw more nuanced and useful
information from the health system. Insurers and others have used
information about actual patient experience in the health system to
demonstrate that certain drugs are less safe than expected,6 that some
treatments may be more cost-effective at providing the same benefit,7 that
some patients gain more benefit from a particular treatment than others,8 or
that a drug should be moved from prescription-only to over-the-counter
status.9 Recently, FDA has even gained the statutory authority to use this type
of real-world evidence to approve new indications for drugs.10 More broadly,
3 See, e.g., James R Broughman & Ronald C Chen, Using Big Data for Quality Assessment in
Oncology, 5 J. COMP. EFF. RES. 309 (2016).
4 See, e.g., Broughman & Chen, supra note 3.
5 See Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA), Pub. L. No.
114-10, 129 Stat. 87, § 102 (requiring a plan to develop data-based measures for physician and
hospital performance), § 101 (creating payment incentive structures using those measures).
6 See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 2, at __ (discussing the identification of toxic side
effects of the painkiller Vioxx by Kaiser Permanente, which analyzed patient records in its
integrated health system and found higher rates of heart attacks among patients taking Vioxx
than among patients taking other similar drugs).
7 See id. § I.C.2 (describing cost-effectiveness research and the use of observational studies
of patient data to perform such research).
8 See id. (describing comparative-effectiveness research).
9 Id. at § I.A.1 (describing a petition filed by Blue Cross of California (later Wellpoint) to
take certain antihistamines, including Claritin, over-the-counter).
10 See 21st Century CURES Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022 (requiring FDA to “establish
a program to evaluate the potential use of real world evidence” for the approval of new
indications for an already-approved drug or to fulfill post-approval study or surveillance
requirements). This provision has been the subject of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Jerry
Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The 21st Century Cures Act — Will It Take Us Back in Time?, 372
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health data can potentially lead to advances in precision medicine. Precision
medicine, the scientific tailoring of medical treatment to reflect individual
patient variation, requires knowing how different patients respond to different
forms of treatment.11 Some of this knowledge can be generated by classical
hypothesis-driven scientific and clinical studies, but other advances, including
those relying on machine-learning and other forms of datamining, rely on large
sets of existing health data.12
Overall, health data offer substantial promise for improving health care,
both in terms of near-term patient-specific benefits and in terms of later
innovations to improve the health system. Unfortunately, these benefits have
been slow to materialize. At least in part, this slowness has resulted from the
fragmentation of health data.13
B. Fragmentation
Why are health data today so fragmented? There are at least three linked
reasons. First, and most obviously, care itself is fragmented. Second, and
related, competition between entities in the health system reduces incentives to
connect and link data. Third and finally, legal barriers to information sharing,
especially the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, make it
hard to link data.
1. Fragmented care
The key underlying cause of health data fragmentation is that health care is
itself fragmented, and with it the generation and storage of health data.14
N. ENGL. J. MED. 2473 (2015).
11 Laura K. Wiley et al., Harnessing next-Generation Informatics for Personalizing Medicine: A
Report from AMIA’s 2014 Health Policy Invitational Meeting, 23 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC. 413
(2016); Marc L Berger et al., Opportunities and Challenges in Leveraging Electronic Health Record Data
in Oncology, 12 FUTURE ONCOL. 1261 (2016).
12 See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 429–34, 437–
39 (2015) (describing the big data potential and requirements of next-generation black-box
medicine).
13 The fragmentation of health data is certainly not the only cause for the delay in realizing
benefits of health data innovation. Some actors lack the right incentives to actively move
toward the highest-quality, most efficient care. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Price, supra note 2, at __
(discussing the problematic incentives for health insurers and for drug manufacturers); David
Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 UNIV.
RICHMOND L. REV. 155 (1996) (discussing the incentives of doctors to provide more care than
necessary). Technological hurdles also play a role. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 2, at §
I.D. And even once innovative information is generated, getting health care providers to
implement the new knowledge can be challenging. Id. at § II.B.
14 See, e.g., Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health Care Uniquely Inefficient,
22 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2008) (noting popular wisdom that the American health care system is
exceptionally fragmented).
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Patients see different doctors at different times, visit different drugstores,
change insurers, and in other ways participate in an inherently fragmented
health system.15 Correspondingly, hospitals, doctors, insurers, and pharmacies
all keep their own records. These records are generated for different purposes
and may use different terms or code different information.16 For instance,
insurance claims records are principally generated for the purpose of payment;
accordingly, they lack some forms of care data and may potentially be
skewed.17 The relevant information about patient care is thus spread among
different actors in the health care system, in different forms.
Health data are not only generated in the course of health care. Research
companies like 23andMe collect substantial health information18 but are not
involved in care, and keep their data separate—potentially to be used for later
commercial research. Non-care entities, like Fitbit (whose activity trackers
monitor physical activity),19 Apple (which aims to create a personal digital hub
of health information),20 or others, also generate health data—but they are, of
course, largely separate from the system of health and hold different data in
different places as well. Overall, different entities both within and outside the
health care system generate data separately, which are then held in different
siloes. This might not be so problematic if communication and data-sharing
between the siloes were easy and seamless. Unfortunately, it isn’t.
2. Data competition
Even for parallel entities, like multiple doctors that a patient may see,
competition also keeps data fragmented. Theoretically, among care providers,
competition should be irrelevant; the duty of care to patients should preclude
competitive hoarding of data or refusal to share data. But no such pressure
exists for the providers of diagnostic tests, for instance, or among others that
See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 2, at § II.B.
Id.
17 Id. at I.D.
18 Antonio Regalado, 23andMe Sells Data for Drug Search, MIT TECH. REV. (June 21, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601506/23andme-sells-data-for-drug-search/
(describing 23andMe’s collection of data and its sales of data subsets to over a dozen drug
companies, including to Genentech for $10 million to search for Parkinson’s drugs).
19 Other sports companies are getting into the health data game. For instance, Nike
recently signed a multimillion-dollar deal to collect and analyze performance data collected
from athletes at the University of Michigan. Marc Tracy, With Wearable Tech Deals, New Player
Data
Is
Up
for
Grabs,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sep.
9,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/wearable-technology-nikeprivacy-college-football.html.
20 See Apple, iOS-Health, http://www.apple.com/ios/health/ (describing the iOS Health
App, which collects phone data and can serve as a repository for personal medical records).
15
16
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collect health or health-related data.21
In addition to competition between those who generate data, there is
competition between the vendors who provide ways of generating and
managing data. The electronic health record market is itself fragmented, with
hundreds of vendors.22 This itself could lead organically to fragmentation
through interoperability, as different vendors develop and sell different
systems that might happen not to work with each other. However, there is
evidence that electronic health record vendors do more, deliberately designing
systems that are mutually incompatible to lock customers in and prevent easy
migration between systems.23 This lack of interoperability obviously hinders
consolidation of data, transfers between providers as patients move, and the
integration of care.
3. Legal barriers
A third barrier to integrating health data comes from legal barriers to datasharing, especially the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
commonly known as HIPAA.24 HIPAA places limits on how personally
identifiable health data may be used and disclosed.25 In general, all uses and
disclosures of such information by covered entities—providers, insurers, and
health data clearinghouses26—are prohibited unless specifically permitted. To
21 Perhaps the most well-documented such proprietary data silo is that held by Myriad
Genetics, which amassed a dataset of information about women tested for mutations in the
breast-cancer-related BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes while it held patents on those genes. See, e.g.,
Misha Angrist & Robert Cook-Deegan, Distributing the Future: The Weak Justifications for Keeping
Human Genomic Databases Secret and the Challenges and Opportunities in Reverse Engineering Them, 3
APPL. TRANSL. GENOMICS 124 (2014) (describing Myriad’s dataset and others like it); Dan L.
Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 BU J. SCI. & TECH. L. 233 (2015)
(describing how patents led to Myriad’s competitive advantage).
22 See OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, HOSPITAL HER VENDORS (July 2016), https://dashboard.healthit.gov/
quickstats/pages/FIG-Vendors-of-EHRs-to-Participating-Hospitals.php. The top six vendors
provide services for 92% of all nonfederal acute-care hospitals. Id.
23 See OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: REPORT ON HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING 11–
19 (April 2015), www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf
(defining “information blocking” as “when persons or entities knowingly and unreasonably
interfere with the exchange or use of electronic health information” and providing evidence of
such practices).
24 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 100 Stat. 2548.
25 HIPAA’s principal data restrictions come from the Privacy Rule, codified at 45 C.F.R.
§§ 150ff. HIPAA’s regulatory structure is complex and need not be discussed in full here; for
additional information, see, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Summary of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule (May 2003), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/lawsregulations/ (providing HIPAA overview); Eisenberg & Price, supra note 2, at __ (discussing
the Privacy Rule in the context of research using existing health data).
26 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Uses or disclosures by the business associates of covered entities
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be sure, some permissions are quite broad, such as the use or disclosure of
information for the purpose of “health care operations.” Theoretically, this
should make it easy to share information related to patient care. But HIPAA
still creates substantial informal barriers; providers and insurers are notorious
for refusing to share information with the blanket invocation of HIPAA,
including for uses expressly permitted.27
HIPAA creates more substantial and formal barriers to sharing
information for secondary research purposes. Research is expressly not a
permitted purpose for use or disclosure of protected health information.28 As
a result, secondary research often involves health information that has been
de-identified, which takes it out of HIPAA’s ambit.29 However, as I have
discussed elsewhere, de-identification can increase the fragmentation of health
data, because reassembling data about a patient from different sources
becomes substantially more difficult—deliberately so—without identifying
information.30 Finally, HIPAA creates barriers between different types of
entities that assemble or create health data. HIPAA governs only “covered
entities” that are directly involved in the health system. But increasingly,
relevant health information is held by entities outside the that system, such as
23andMe, Fitbit, Apple, or others. None of these entities, or the data they
hold, are directly governed by HIPAA.31 Setting aside concerns this raises
about fragmented governance of health data,32 it also helps encourage
fragmentation through disparate treatment of different entities with different
forms of health data.
Notably, there have also been governmental efforts to encourage
are governed, though by contract rather than directly under HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. 45 C.F.R.
§ 152(a)(3).
27 For examples of refusals to share information, see, e.g., Paula Span, Hipaa’s Use as Code of
Silence Often Misinterprets the Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2015), http:// www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/21/health/hipaas-use-as-code-of-silence-often-misinterprets-the-law.html?_r=0.
28 21 C.F.R. § 164.501. Notably, an initial version of the 21st Century CURES Act
included a provision adding research as a permissible purpose for use or, directing the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to “revise or clarify” the Privacy Rule so that research
“including studies whose purpose is to obtain generalizable knowledge” is included as part of
the exception for health care operations. See H.R. 6 (2015), 114th Congress, § 1124, available
at https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr6/BILLS-114hr6ih.xml). As passed, the legislation
calls instead for the study of such an amendment to the Privacy Rule. Pub. L. No. 114-255
(2016), § 2063.
29 HIPAA governs only personally identifiable health information; a safe harbor exempts
any information from which 17 pieces of identifying information have been removed.
30 See Price, Patents, Big Data, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1413
(2016).
31 If these entities are business associates of covered entities, they may be regulatd by
HIPAA as described in note 26, supra.
32 See Nicolas Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Healthcare Data Protection, 17 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS __ (2017).
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interoperability between different health data systems. The Office of the
National Coordinator has set out a goal of electronic health record
interoperability by 2021 to 2024.33 And, of course, the push toward electronic
health records was itself a federal initiative.34 Other private systems have been
created with the goal of collecting data across providers with the goal of
ensuring continuous care and easing the processing of claims; however, these
efforts have met with real challenges.35 Overall, health data in the US health
care system remain highly fragmented among different entities, working with
different and often mutually incompatible health records systems.
II. RISKS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The risks from a fragmented health data system are substantial. These
risks come in two main buckets: primary risks, which is to say risks to patients
seeking care in the health system; and secondary risks, which is to say risks that
arise when health data are repurposed and used to innovate or improve the
system. The primary risks from a fragmented system of health data include,
among others, problems in patient care and privacy risks to patient
information.
The risks that arise in patient care mirror the potential benefits of
electronic health records. If doctors are used to patient information being
present in files—to indicate, for example, the presence of an allergy or a drug
with potential negative interactions—doctors may be less likely to seek out or
independently confirm that information in the absence of an EHR record.
This works fine if the information is actually present, but decreases the
likelihood of catch an error when the information is missing due to
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, CONNECTING HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A 10-YEAR VISION TO
ACHIEVE
AN
INTEROPERABLE
HEALTH
IT
INFRASTRUCTURE
(2014),
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/ONC10yearInteroperabilityConceptPaper.pdf;
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY,
CONNECTING HEALTH AND CARE FOR THE NATION: A SHARED NATIONWIDE
INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP (Draft Version 1.0 April 2015), http://www.healthit.gov/
sites/default/files/nationwide-interoperability-roadmap-draft-version-1.0.pdf
34 See ARRA, supra note 1.
35 For instance, a group of large insurers in California created Cal INDEX, a health
information exchange with the goal of automatically collecting and linking patient data from
many providers. See Cal INDEX, New California Not-for-Profit to Operate Statewide, NextGeneration Health Information Exchange (August 5, 2014), https://www.calindex.org/newcalifornia-healthcare-exchange/ (last accessed July 16, 2016) (“Cal INDEX will securely collect
and integrate clinical data from providers and claims data from payers to create
comprehensive, retrievable patient-centered records known as longitudinal patient records
(LPRs)”). The effort has met with limited success thus far. See Beth Kutcher, Insurers build
broad data exchange in California, but providers are slow to join, MODERN HEALTHCARE (March 6,
2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160305/MAGAZINE/303059948.
33
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fragmentation or otherwise.
Similarly, to the extent that failures of interoperability and mistakes from
assembling fragmented data introduce active errors in the system, this creates
the chance for medical errors which can result in real harm to the patient. If,
for instance, a medical administrator receives the records from a previous
physician by fax and then adds them by hand to a patient’s current record, he
might accidentally introduce errors that can compromise future care.36
Lastly, when health data aren’t meaningfully collected, we lose the
opportunity to experience better, data-driven care than what we now receive.
This isn’t a classic “risk,” but it does result in costs to patients measured in
benefits foregone. To take a simple example, suppose that, as part of a
research study, a young woman has her genome sequenced;37 further suppose
that, although this woman not in a high-risk demographic group, she is in fact
positive for an allele of the BRCA1 gene that substantially increases her risk of
breast cancer. The researcher may not provide her with this information,38 and
there is a substantial likelihood that her genome sequence may be totally
separate from her medical records used for primary care. Thus, the patient
may not be more rigorously screened for breast cancer, as she would be if had
been identified (by that doctor or another involved in her direct care) as a
woman with a deleterious BRCA1 allele. In one sense, no new risk has been
introduced—but in another, an opportunity for improved care has been
missed.
The currently fragmented health data system also creates risks to patient
privacy. Patient health data are considered by many to be especially sensitive,
meaning that disclosure of such information is an especially substantial privacy
concern.39 Different actors in the system store information in different ways,
Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, The Use and Misuse of Biomedical Data: Is Bigger
Really Better?, 39 AM. J. LAW MED. 497 (2013).
37 For the sake of the example, let us assume the lab is CLIA-certified, and that the
genetic sequencing is thus of high-enough quality to guide clinical care.
38 A substantial literature considers the question of returning results from genetic
research. For an introduction, see Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human
Subjects Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J. LAW. MED. ETHICS 361 (2008) (surveying
the field); see also Ellen Wright Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of
Genomics Research, 14 GENET. MED. 473 (2012) (noting legal risks); R. C. Green et al., ACMG
Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing,” 15
GENETICS MED. 565 (2013) (recommending that a set of identified mutations always be
returned to patients); Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Models of Consent to Return of Incidental Findings in
Genomic Research, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 23 (2014) (noting different models of returning data
and different possibilities for informed consent).
39 See Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Balancing Privacy and Accountability for BlackBox Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (describing the privacy concerns
related to patient health information); Nicolas Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in an Era of Big
Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385 (2012).
36
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leading both to less-secure implementations (in, for instance, the office of the
solo practitioner that needs to duplicate and keep unnecessary information
because it is not available from labs, insurers or specialists directly), and to
potential vulnerabilities during information-sharing, when that occurs.
Perhaps more importantly, the clunkiness of the system leads to workarounds
and kludges that pose inherent security risks. For instance, problems with
interoperability (and potentially with HIPAA) may be related to the otherwisebaffling persistence of faxed requests for information between different
providers. Hand-answered, unvalidated, and difficult-to-audit fax requests
suffer by comparison with high-security, auditable electronic data transfers, but
remain the transfer mechanism of choice for some.40
The secondary risks from fragmented data come from efforts to use those
data for future innovation.41 Such efforts include the FDA’s Sentinel initiative
to monitor drug usage for safety risks,42 observational studies to drive care
(which can potentially be used to approve new drug indications under the 21st
Century Cures Act43), machine-learning efforts to suss out new biological
relationships,44 and implementations of a learning health-care system
generally.45 All of these require that data be high-quality and function much
better without substantial gaps in data from different sources or time periods.
Fragmentation and errors in health data hinder these efforts. If they don’t
happen, that is one cost—the foregone benefit of innovation lost. But other
risks materialize when innovation relies on incomplete or faulty data. To the
extent that new care innovations are based on bad data, they may incorporate
errors, biases, or other problems.46 A fundamental datamining principle is
“garbage in, garbage out;” when health care fragmentation creates inaccuracies
in data later used in innovation, that innovation suffers, and so may future
patients.

40 For instance, the University of Michigan Health System’s request for records from
another doctor—which itself must be filled out by the patient for each other provider, since
no centralized system exists) offers options only for phoning or faxing to request records from
another provider.
41 See generally Eisenberg & Price, supra note 2 (describing potential innovation by healthcare payers using existing health data).
42 Susan Forrow et al., The Organizational Structure and Governing Principles of the Food and Drug
Administration’s Mini-Sentinel Pilot Program, 21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOL. DRUG SAF. 12 (2012).
43 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022 (requiring the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to “establish a program to evaluate the potential use of real world
evidence . . . to help support the approval of a new indication for a drug.”).
44 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 12.
45 See, e.g., Harlan M. Krumholz, Big Data and New Knowledge in Medicine: The Thinking,
Training, and Tools Needed for a Learning Health System, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1163 (2014).
46 See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and
Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L. MED. ETHICS 56 (2013).
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III. BENEFITS OF RESILIENT HEALTH DATA INFRASTRUCTURE
The risks of fragmented and insecure health data may be at least partially
addressed by considering the system in terms of infrastructure—both for health
data, and of health data.
First, the continued fragmentation of health data suggests that the current
system is unsustainable. Each actor is responsible for generating, collecting,
and storing the data for its own interactions with patients in the health system,
and this has led to the substantial risks described above. Given the potential
benefits of integrated patient data, effort must be expended at a systemic level
to create infrastructure for the sharing, integration, and storage of patient data.
This effort need not take any specific form, but the idea of infrastructure for
health data, and the risks of fragmented health data, suggest some features of
the desired state.
An infrastructure for health data could follow different models of varying
centralization. It could exist as a fully centralized health database, where each
patient has a single integrated patient record to which different care providers
or other entities add data. Alternately, health data could reside in decentralized
repositories, much like the current system, but with increased connectivity
between the repositories and more rigorous standards that let data be
meaningfully transferred between and collated across repositories.47 This
model is closest to the current system—but that closeness demonstrates
potential problems, since even with federal initiatives to drive interoperability,
fragmentation persists.48 A fully decentralized system might have individual
patients maintain their own data, such as on a personal medical card that
includes the entire patient record.49 Such a system would similarly rely on
meaningful standards to ensure transportability and access of patient data by
different actors in the health care system.
Any of these systems might potentially work as infrastructure for health
data, to help enable care. However, a centralized system carries a substantial
benefit when considering health data as infrastructure for later health
innovation.50 Decentralized data are fragmented along different dimension—
not necessarily among different providers and actors in the health system, but
between different patients. However, many benefits of health data rely on
See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 148–49 (2016) (describing federated databases and
their privacy benefits).
48 See supra Section I.B.
49 See, e.g., Michael Chen & Adrian Gropper, Patient-Centered EHR Features and Demo,
www.hieofone.org (October 15, 2016) (describing and demoing the concept for an entirely
patient-focused individual health record).
50 See OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION: BIG DATA FOR GROWTH & WELL-BEING,
177–206 (2015) (applying an infrastructure model for big data generally).
47
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aggregating data from many patients, including precision medicine, quality
metrics, and efficiency measures. The risks for health innovation described
above include the problems of biases from incomplete data and the risk of
innovation being absent altogether. Centralized health data ameliorate these
risks by creating comprehensive datasets for future analysis.
Infrastructure goods are typically undersupplied.51 Infrastructure resources
are nonrivalrous inputs into a wide range of output services and goods, with
social demand “driven primarily by downstream productive activity,”52 and
substantial spillover benefits.53 Accordingly, we expect private actors to invest
at suboptimal levels in infrastructure spending, suggesting a need for some
form of central investment.54 The federal government is an obvious choice,
and indeed the federal government already operates substantial examples of
health data infrastructure.55 These include the multi-site-but-connected
Sentinel Project (wherein FDA collects safety information on drugs in use),56
the Medicare and Medicaid systems, the Veterans Administration,57 and—
specifically focused on forward-looking health research—the Precision
Medicine Initiative, aiming to collect comprehensive data on at least one
million Americans.58 An alternate model could rely on public-private
partnerships, joining a central government authority with nonprofit actors.59
However, there is no fundamental requirement that the infrastructure provider
be governmental or nonprofit; a for-profit entity can provide public
infrastructure given appropriate incentives.60
Centralization has complex effects on potential privacy risks. On the one
BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 14–15 (2013) (“society should expect underprovision of [infrastructure] goods.”).
52 Id. at xiv.
53 Id. at 5–6.
54 Id. at 14–15.
55 See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 2, at __; FRISCHMANN, supra note 51, at 14 (noting
government provision of goods as a classic solution to infrastructure problems, alongside
government subsidies, community provision, and policies to allow private actors to charge
supramarginal costs).
56 See Health Affairs, Health Affairs Health Policy Brief, The FDA’s Sentinel Initiative. (June 4,
2015), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_139.pdf; Price,
Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, supra note 30, at 1441–42 (describing the Sentinel
project’s data implications); Ryan Abbott, The Sentinel Initiative as Knowledge Commons, in
GOVERNING MEDICAL COMMONS (BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, MICHAEL J. MADISON, &
KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG, EDS.) (forthcoming).
57 See Price, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, supra note 30, at 1440–41 (describing
the Veterans Administration’s data).
58 Id. at 1442–43; Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine,
372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 793 (2015).
59 See FRISCHMANN, supra note 51, at 14.
60 Examples include toll-road operators, power companies, and other public utilities. See
id. Of course, these monopolies raise their own concerns about potential rent-seeking
behavior.
51
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hand, centralization creates a broader picture of an individual’s health—
indeed, that’s the point—but that makes it easier to derive more information
about an already-identified individual, and also potentially makes it easier to
identify a de-identified individual from a larger collection of data.61 A
centralized system is also a more attractive target for attacks. On the other
hand, centralization, or just a coherent infrastructure, allows some privacyenhancing technologies to be deployed, such as one-way hashing, datasetdocking, or simply scaled security given the possible concentration of
resources at a single location.
CONCLUSION
The health system relies on data, but collects and maintains those data in a
haphazard, fragmented, and insecure way that creates real risks for patients and
for the system as a whole. Given market incentives driving competition
among different data systems and health actors, health data seem likely to
remain fragmented without broader systemic action.
Conceiving of
infrastructure both for and of health data suggests that standardized,
centralized collection and maintenance of health data may create goods at both
the individual and systemic level. If we are to realize the goal of data-informed
patient care and data-driven development of future medical technology, an
infrastructure for health data provides a substantial step in the right direction.

61 For instance, there may be many people in a particular health system that fit two or
three given characteristics; many fewer fit twenty or thirty, and two or three hundred would be
much more likely to apply only to a single individual. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (noting in the Fourth Amendment context
that collections of otherwise non-individualized characteristics can identify an individual).
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